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1. An Economist’s Perspective on Match-fixing and Self-sabotage in Contests

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dc.contributor.author Bibhas Saha
dc.date.accessioned 2016-07-23T06:36:26Z
dc.date.available 2016-07-23T06:36:26Z
dc.date.issued 2015-07
dc.identifier.issn 2277-9752
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2259/894
dc.description IIM Kozhikode Society & Management Review 4(2) 77–85 © 2015 Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode en_US
dc.description.abstract In this note we provide an economist’s perspective on self-sabotage in contests. When such self-sabotage is engineered at the behest of a third party for financial gains from betting markets, we see the twin problems of self-sabotage and betting corruption, which are known as the problem of match-fixing in sporting contests. We discuss the hidden incentives that different agents face in this environment. To curb match-fixing, legalization of betting would be a positive step followed by intelligent enforcement. Further, using a simple model we demonstrate that the risk of match-fixing diminishes with the number of teams involved in the contest. en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Sage Publications en_US
dc.subject Sports betting en_US
dc.subject Corruption en_US
dc.subject Match-fixing en_US
dc.subject Self-sabotage en_US
dc.title 1. An Economist’s Perspective on Match-fixing and Self-sabotage in Contests en_US
dc.type Article en_US

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  • July [11]
    2015: Vol 4 (2): 77-173

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