Abstract:
Two hundred and forty-nine male postgraduate students of management played the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (Deutsch 1960) and filled out a postgame questionnaire measuring atttitude toward the 'other player'. Striking differences resulted between trusting and trustworthy subjects on the one hand and suspicious and untrustworthy subjects on the other with respect to different meanings given to the dimension of trust (cooperation) in the interaction. As predicted, trusting behaviour of the other player was given a a positive evaluative meaning - good versus bad - by the trusting and trustworthy subjects and negative dynamism meaning - weak versus strong - by the suspicious and untrustworthy subjects. The trusting players expected the typical other to make either trusting or suspicious moves, whereas the suspicious subjects expected the typical other to be uniformly suspicious, yielding a high Triangularity Index (Kelley and Stahelski 1970). Most provocatively, while 51% of trusting subjects ...
